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ARTICLES� 
Interests and Animals, 
In Interests and Rights / The Case 
Against Animals /1 R. G. Frey believes 
he has animal rights advocates firmly 
skewered on the horns of a dilemma: 
(1) Animal rights advocates 
agree that "all and only beings 
which (can) have interests 
(can) have moral rights. " 
Frey labels this "the interest 
requirement. "2 
(2) Interests must be divided 
into needs and desi res. 3 
(3) If "interests" in (1) 
refers to needs, then plants, 
tractors, cave drawings, and 
other mere things (can) have 
interests and / consequently / 
(can) have moral rights (at 
least as far as the interest 
requi rement is concerned) . 
But this is so counter-intuitive 
as to be unacceptable even to 
animal rights advocates. 4 
(4) If "interests" in (1) 
refers to desires, animals can­
not have them and, conse­
quently / cannot have moral 
rights. Animals cannot have 
desi res because (a) having 
desires requires beliefs or 
self-consciousness, (b) both of 
these require linguistic ability, 
but (c) animals lack linguistic 
ability.5 
Thus, Frey claims that a careful anal­
ysis of "interests" shows that the 
claim that animals (can) have moral 
rights either leads to absurdity or is 
false. 
Frey is wrong on both counts. If 
the interest requirement refers to 
needs / it does not follow that plants / 
artifacts, and other mere things (can) 
have moral rights, for plants, arti­
facts/ etc. / do not have the kinds of 
needs which generate interests. If 
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the inte rest req uirement refe rs to 
desires, it does not follow that animals 
cannot have interests, for having 
desires does not require linguistic 










Frey distinguishes having an inter­
est from taking an interest, generally 
using "need" for the former and 
"desire" for the latter. According to 
Frey, one has an interest in or needs 
X if X contributes (will contribute, 
would contribute) to his good or 
well-being. One need not care about 
this relation or even be aware of it 
for this need to exist. For example, 
one needs vitamin C for good health 
whether or not one cares about or is 
even aware of this. Frey then goes 
on to remind us that plants, artifacts, 
and other mere things can be intelli­
gibly said to need things ("tractors 
need oil") / to be harmed or benefited 
("the Rembrandt painting would be 
harmed by exposure to the sun")' to 
be good of their kind ("that's a good 
example of a night blooming jasmine"), 
and to have things that are good for 
them ("a sunny corner protected from 
the wind is a good place to plant this 
kind of shrub"). He concludes from 
this that if we interpret the interest 
requirement as referring to having 
needs, then plants, artifacts, and 
other mere things (can) have moral 
rights. 6 
But would we ordinarily say, as 
Frey does, that "it is in a tractor's 
interests to be well-oiled"? 7 I think 
not. While "need/" "want/" "Iack/" 
"good/" "harm/" and "benefit" are all 
commonly applied to plants, artifacts, 
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etc., "interest" is not. "Interest" is 
ordinarily reserved for the people and 
other animals who will benefit or. be 
harmed by the needs of the plants, 
artifacts, etc., being met or unmet. 
For example, the tractor "needs oil," 
but it is "in the farmer's interest," 
not the tractor's, that his tractor be 
well-oiled. Again, wheat "needs 
water" to su rvive and flou rish, but it 
is "in the farmer's interest," not the 
wheat's, that his wheat be properly 
watered. Thus, the ordinary use of 
"interest" tells us that plants, arti­
facts, and other mere things not only 
take no interest in what benefits or 
harms them; they also have no inter­
est in these things. So, "having a 
good of one's own," "being capable of 
being benefited or harmed," or, sim­
ply, "having a need" does not provide 
an adequate analysis of having an 
interest. Consequently, by basing 
the reductio in his dilemma on inter­
preting having an interest as having a 
need, Frey has refuted a strawman. 
Setting aside special legal and eco­
nomic meanings of "having an inter­
est," I would offer the following as a 
more adequate interpretation of that 
concept: P has an interest in X if 
and only if X affects (will affect, 
would affect) P's feelings of well-be­
ing. I understand "feelings of well­
being" to refer to such feelings as 
pleasure and pain, feeling well and 
feeling ill, elation and depression, 
feelings of fulfillment and of frustra­
tion, and the many other feelings 
which contribute to or detract from 
the enjoyment of or satisfaction with 
life. 8 
This interpretation can readily 
explain why people can unknowingly 
have an interest in vitamin C, trac­
tors being well-oiled, and wheat being 
properly watered, while plants, arti­
facts, and other non-feeling things 
cannot have an interest in anything. 
Furthermore, distinguishing affective 
needs, which generate interests, from 
non-affective needs, which do not 
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generate interests, can explain why 
some people do not even have an 
interest (and, consequently, justifia­
bly take no interest) in some things 
they can properly be said to need. 
For example, suppose that I am defi­
nitely overweight and would need to 
exercise regularly and watch my diet 
in order to slim down but that I do 
not mind being fat and that my over­
all enjoyment of life will not be dimin'­
ished by my being fat. Perhaps my 
being fat prevents me from engaging 
in certain activities I would have 
enjoyed and will shorten my life some­
what, but is is also an important con­
tributor to my happiness, since my 
fine tenor voice, which I love and 
from which I profit handsomely, could 
not be as fine without the fat and 
since the crowd I go with and whose 
company I greatly enjoy feels more at 
ease and jolly with fat people. Fur­
thermore, exercising and dieting might 
be highly unpleasant for me and would 
certainly deprive me of one of my 
dearest pleasures, eating with aban­
don. I n this way, being fat might 
give me a somewhat shorter but 
over-all happier life than would being 
slim. In this case, although it might 
be good for me to lose.weight (i.e., 
be "good for my health" or "necessary 
for good health"), I could properly 
claim that it is not in my interest to 
spend my time exercising and watch­
ing my diet. It is in my interest to 
spend my time fulfilling those needs 
which will enhance my enjoyment of 
life and to neglect those needs which 
will not. Pursuing good health is 
usually in one's interest, since good 
health is important for one's feelings 
of well-being, but when that pursuit 
undermines those feelings, it ceases to 
be in one's interest. Thus, not 
merely whether one needs X but 
whether X will affect one's feelings of 
well-being seems to be the crucial 
factor in having an interest in X. 9 
Applying this more adequate inter­
pretation of having an interest to the 
I 
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interest requirement, it follows that 
all and only those beings which (can) 
have affective needs (can) have moral 
rights. This certainly excludes 
plants, artifacts, and other non-feel­
ing things from having moral rights. 
So, Frey's reductio fails. Further­
more, since Frey acknowledges that 
some animals can at least "suffer 
unpleasant sensations," 1 D it would 
seem to follow that he must agree that 
some animals have affective needs 
and, consequently, have interests and 
meet the interest requirement for hav­
ing moral rights. 
II. Desires 
Frey draws a distinction between 
desires which req'uire beliefs such as 
"I don't have X," "I would be better 
off if I had X," and "in order to get 
X, I have to do Y" and "simple 
desires," such as wanting food, which 
are reflexive and cannot, therefore, 
involve the mediation of beliefs, 
although having any such simple 
desires, he insists, requires that at 
least some of one's simple desires 
involve self-consciousness. Frey then 
argues that animals cannot have 
desires of either sort, for both 
believing and self-consciousness 
requi re language, and animals are 
incapable of using language. 11 
Frey offers the following argument 
to show that only .Ianguage users can 
believe: 
Now what is it that I believe? 
I believe that my collection 
lacks a Gutenberg Bible; that 
is, I believe that the sentence 
'My collection lacks a Guten­
berg Bible' is true. In 
expressions of the form 'I 
believe that . . .', what fol­
lows the 'that' is a sentence, 
and what I believe is that the 
sentence in true. The 
essence of this argument is . 
about what is believed. If 
what is believed is that a 
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certain sentence is true, then 
no creature which lacks lan­
guage can have beliefs. .. 
do not see how the cat can be 
correctly described as believ­
ing the laces are tied unless it 
can, as I do, distinguish 
between the beliefs that the 
laces are tied and that the 
laces are untied and regards 
one but not the other as true. 
But what is true or false are 
not states of affai rs wh ich 
reflect or pertain to these 
beliefs; states of affairs are 
not true or false (though sen­
tences describing them are) 
but either a re or a re not the 
case. 12 
Thus, Frey contends that when some­
one believes something, what he 
believes is that a certain sentence is 
true. Frey believes this because (1) 
in bel ief statements sentences are 
used to express what is believed and 
(2) what one bel ieves is that some­
thing is true (or false), and sen­
tences are the sorts of things that are 
true (or false). Both of these argu­
ments are seriously faulty. 
(1) Which grammatical forms are 
employed in expressing the objects of 
intentional verbs is one issue; what 
those intentional objects are is another 
issue, and an answer for the fi rst 
issue is no more an answer for the 
second issue than linguistics is a sub­
stitute for psychology. The proper 
conclusion of Frey's analysis of belief 
statements is that in order to under­
stand such statements, one must be 
able to understand sentences. This 
conclusion is neither controversial nor 
relevant to the issue of whether ani­
mals can believe: it is relevant only 
to whether animals can formulate or 
respond to belief statements. 
Furthermore, using intentional 
verbs whose objects are sentences in 
referring to and describing animals is 
a common practice. We commonly say 
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such things as "the dog thin ks the 
cat is in the tree," "the bird realized 
that one of its chicks is missing," 
"the cat recognizes that the ice is 
slippery," "the monkey sees that 
strangers are invading his territory," 
" the deer senses that we are closing 
in on it," "the zebra smells that a 
leopard is near," and "the horse 
hears that it is being called." In 
saying such things we do not presume 
that the dog, for example, thinks of 
the sentence "the cat is in the tree" 
or that it cou Id assent to that sen­
tence, if asked whether it is true. 
Nonetheless, we understand the above 
sentences, know when they do and do 
not apply, and, in general, use them 
without problem. Thus, ordinary lan­
guage does not support Frey's con­
tention that if an intentional verb 
takes a sentence for its object, then 
it properly applies only to those capa­
ble of understanding sentences. 13 
Frey might counter that this just 
shows how pervasive is the pro-animal 
prejudice. However, such a claim 
reminds one of the band member who 
claims that he's okay; it's the rest of 
the band that's out of step. If ordi­
nary language philosophy has taught 
us anything, it has taught us which 
to choose when we have to choose 
between ordinary language being non­
sensical and a philosophical analysis 
being mistaken. 14 
Another problem with Frey's argu­
ment is that if we were to apply his 
pattern of analysis to other intentional 
verbs, we would arrive at the follow­
ing reductio of his position: just as 
animals are incapable of belief, they 
are incapable of hearing, for when I 
hear that someone is coming, what I 
hear is that the sentence "someone is 
coming" is true, but animals are not 
capable of doing this. Again, animals 
cannot smell, for when I smell that 
something is burning, what I smell is 
that the sentence "something is burn­
ing" is true, and animals cannot 
formulate or understand sentences. 
Such conclusions seem either to be 
preposterous or to indicate that stipu­
lative definitions of "hear," "smell," 
and "believe" are being used. Such 
abnormal definitions could be based on 
what Malcolm has described as "the 
prejudice of philosophers that only 
propositional thoughts belong to con­
sciousness. "15 
It might be thought that Frey is 
not really faced with the preceding 
dilemma, for he does not claim that 
his analysis applies to all intentional 
verbs. However, nothing in what 
Frey says indicates that his analysis 
is restricted to believing. Since per­
ceptions, like beliefs, can be true or 
false and since "hear that," "see 
that," etc., can be parsed like 
"believe that" to take sentences as 
their objects, it would be arbitrary to 
try to escape the problems of the 
previous paragraph by insisting that 
Frey's analysis applies only to believ­
ing. 
Finally, it may be thought that 
Frey can escape all the preceding 
objections, since he claims that 
though it may be thought that 
my analysis of belief requires 
persons to entertain the con­
cept of a sentence in order to 
have beliefs, this in fact is not 
the case. . . . The sentence 
'John believes that the window 
is open' . . . can be plausibly 
interpreted as 'John would, if 
asked, assent to some sentence 
that has for him the meaning 
that "the window is open" has 
for us'. 16 
One obvious objection to Frey's con­
tention that being able to' formulate 
sentences is essential for believing is 
that we often believe things without 
formulating any sentences about them. 
For example, if I reach into my pocket 
for a pencil while listening to a lec­
ture, I believe that I have a pencil in 
my pocket, but I do not formulate the 
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sentence "I have a pencil in my 
pocket. " Frey formulates the above 
interpretation to meet this objection. 
This interpretation is not relevant 
to the objections raised so far in this 
paper. Just as we can believe with­
out entertaining sentences, so we can 
hear, see, recognize, realize, etc., 
without entertaining sentences. So, 
since these intentional verbs take 
sentences as thei r objects, they, too, 
presumably, are to be interpreted in 
terms of what sentences the one who 
hears, sees, recognizes, realizes, 
etc., would assent to. Consequently, 
these verbs would still not be applica­
ble to infants, animals, and other 
non-language users. As long as Frey 
holds that these verbs properly apply 
only to language users, whether he 
maintains that they apply only when 
we entertain sentences or can apply 
as well to situations where we would 
assent to sentences is unimportant. 
Either way, Frey's analysis still runs 
counter to ordinary usage and is 
vulnerable to the above reductio. 
As to whether Frey's interpretation 
provides an answer to the forceful 
objection that psychology does not 
reveal an essential relation between 
believing and sentences, the interpre­
tation does not meet that objection, 
either. First, the interpretation is 
arbitrary. "John would assent to the 
sentence 'the window is open'" is only 
one among many candidates to be a 
dispositional interpretation of "John 
believes that the window is open." 
Other possible candidates are "John 
would close the window, if asked," 
"John would close the window, if he 
felt there was a draft," "John would 
th row something out the window with­
out attempting to open it, if he was 
called upon to throw something out 
the window," "John would not sit near 
the window, if he was afraid of sitting 
near open windows," and so forth. 
Frey provides no reason for 
E&A IV/2 
selecting what John would assent to as 
the interpretation of "John believes 
that the window is open" rather than 
any or all of these other things he 
would do if he believed that. But 
without such an argument, it is not 
obvious that what someone would 
assent to is even a necessary part of 
an interpretation, let alone the inter­
pretation, of believing. We do not 
commonly require that an individual 
assent to or even be willing to assent 
to "p" in order that we feel we have 
satisfactory evidence that he believes 
p. We often just watch what a person 
does to find out what he believes, and 
we hold that "actions speak louder 
than words" in expressing beliefs. 
Even if a subjunctive reference to 
action is a necessary part of an ade­
quate understanding of belief, that 
reference must be vague, for there 
are many alternative sets of actions 
which would commonly be considered 
sufficient to confirm belief. Common 
experience with beliefs does not indi­
cate that there is any particular form 
of action, including assenting to sen­
tences, which one must be ready to 
perform in order to believe something. 
I would guess that it is Frey's belief 
that language is necessary for believ­
ing that leads him to interpret believ­
ing in terms of assenting, but, of 
cou rse, that bel ief begs the question. 
Fu rthermore, it is not obvious that 
"John would, if asked, assent to the 
sentence 'the window is open'" is 
properly described as an interpreta­
tion of "John believes that the window 
is open." If the former were an 
interpretation of the latter, then 
"John believes that the window is 
open but would not assent to the sen­
tence 'the window is open'" would be 
self-contradictory. But it is not. 
Rather, it is an instance of the com­
mon idea "he believes that, but would 
never admit it." Of course, Frey 
might try to meet this sort of objec­
tion by qualifying his interpretation of 
"John believes that the window is 
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open" to read something like "John 
would assent to a sentence that has 
for him the meaning 'the window is 
open' has for us, if as ked under con­
ditions where he felt he had nothing 
to gain th rough deception, did not 
feel like playing a practical joke, felt 
secure in disclosing what he believed, 
etc." However, the effect of adding 
such a ceteris paribus clause to 
Frey's interpretation would be to show 
just how distant is the relation 
between believing and assenting. 
Such a ceteris paribus clause appro­
priately qualifies the relation between 
something and a sign of it, not the 
relation between something and its 
interp retation. 
Again, if "John would, if asked, 
assent to the sentence 'the window is 
open'" were an interpretation of "John 
believes that the window is open," 
then the latter would not be a signifi­
cant answer to a question as to why 
John would assent to the sentence 
"the window is open." If Frey's 
interpretation thesis were correct, 
then John's believing that the window 
is open could not explain why he 
would assent to "the window is open, " 
since "John believes that the window 
is open" would just be another way of 
saying "John would, if asked, assent 
to 'the window is open'." If Frey 
were correct, citing John's belief in 
response to "Why would John assent 
to 'the window is open'?" would con­
tain the same category mistake as 
answering "Why is John a bachelor?" 
with "John is a bachelor because he is 
an unmarried male." However, that 
John believes that the window is open 
does provide a significant answer to 
the question "Why would John assent 
to 'the window is open '?" As an 
explanation of why John would assent 
to that sentence, that Joh n bel ieves 
that the window is open is in the same 
group as the following: John wants 
to please you and feels that by 
assenting to that sentence he will do 
so; Joh n was told that he wi II be set 
free if he assents to that sentence; 
John figu res that he can fool you by 
assenting to that sentence; John 
thinks he can ridicule your research 
by assenting to that sentence; and 
many other plausible, common expla­
nations of why people assent to sen­
tences. That John believes that the 
window is open may be the explanation 
for his willingness to assent to "the 
window is open" which we presume to 
be the correct one in most cases, 
which is why we presume assenting is 
ordinarily a reliable sign of belief. 
However, that priority of place among 
explanations does not change the rela­
tion between believing and willingness 
to assent into one of interpretation. 
The problem with Frey's interpre­
tation of "John believes that p" as 
"John would assent to 'p' under cer­
tain conditions" is that it tries to pass 
off a subjunctive reference to one 
thing belief can lead to as an inter­
pretation of what belief is. But 
since, for the reasons just developed, 
believing that p cannot be identified 
with the fact that one would assent to 
"p" under certain conditions, Frey 
has no more succeeded in providing 
us an interpretation of believing here 
that Euthyphro succeeded in providing 
Socrates with an interpretation of 
piety when he told him that pious men 
a re beloved of the gods (and 
Euthyphro's mistake would not be cor­
rected by substituting "would be" for 
"are" in his interpretation of piety). 
Thus, Frey's proposed interpreta­
tion fails, leaving his contention that 
believing requires linguistic ability 
vulnerable to the many counter-exam­
ples of believing without using lan­
guage. Both our experience of our 
own believings and our commonly, 
significantly applying "believe" and 
many other intentional verbs to 
infants, animals, and other non-lan­
guage users indicate that the fact that 
these verbs take sentences as thei r 
objects does not show that only those 
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capable of recognizing sentences can 
have those verbs meaningfully applied 
to them. 
(2) Frey maintains that his analy­
sis is correct because we would have 
to "credit [animals] with language in 
order for there to be something true 
or false in belief," since "sentences 
are the sorts of things which [are] 
capable of being true or false, 
[whereas] states of affairs are not 
true or false but are or are not the 
case. "17 Setting aside the issue of 
whether animals possess sufficient 
language or something sufficiently 
language-like to satisfy this argument 
without dispute, this argument still 
suffers from the following problems. 
First, validly inferring from beliefs 
involving truth and falsity to beliefs 
involving sentences requires the addi­
tional premise that only sentences can 
be true or false. This is clearly 
false. Currency, portraits, friends, 
signs, omens, impressions, percep­
tions, examples, tools, and lines are 
examples which come readily to mind 
of other things that can be true or 
false. Thus, Frey's argument rests 
on a false premise. 
It might be countered that this 
objection equivocates, since the above 
examples are not all true or false in 
the same way. But such a counter­
argument would just complicate the 
objection a bit: if different kinds of 
things can be true or false in differ­
ent ways, then (a) are beliefs true/ 
false in the way sentences are true/ 
false, and (b) are sentences the only 
things which are true/false in the way 
sentences are true/false? If the ans­
wer to either of these questions is 
"no," Frey's argument still fails, since 
his presumption of a very tight rela­
tion between sentences and being 
true/false (in the relevant sense) will 
be false. Frey does not seem to have 
recognized there is an issue here, for 
he provides no argument to answer 
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these questions. 
Fu rthermore, the answer to ques­
tion (b) seems to be negative; i.e., 
sentences do not seem to be the only 
things that are true/false in the way 
sentences are true/false. If we 
accept a correspondence theory of 
truth for sentences, then portraits 
are true/false in the way sentences 
are. If we adopt a coherence theory 
of truth for sentences, then omens, 
impressions, and perceptions are 
true/false in the way sentences are. 
If we adopt a pragmatic theory of 
truth for sentences, then examples, 
tools, and signs are true/false in the 
way sentences are. Thus, there 
would seem to be sets of things which 
are true/false in the way sentences 
are true/false. Beliefs may be just 
another kind of thing that is true/ 
false in that way. So, even if beliefs 
are true/false in the way sentences 
are, one cannot infer from that that 
beliefs are about sentences. 
Second, if we were told that X and 
Yare both colored or both conduct 
electricity or are both beautiful or are 
both complex, it would remain an open 
question as to just how similar or dis­
similar they were and in what 
sense(s) they were or were not the 
same kind of thing. In Frey's argu­
ment, however, it is presumed that if 
X and Y can both be true/false, that 
shows that they are the same sort of 
thing: he argues that since what is 
believed is that something is true and 
since sentences can be true, the 
something that is believed to be true 
must be a sentence. But just as one 
swallow does not make a summer, so 
having one predicate in common pro­
vides only minimal evidence concerning 
in which way(s) or to what degree 
those things are or are not the same 
kind of thing. Frey's argument from 
having the same kind of predicate to 
being the same kind of thing runs 
dangers analogous to those in infer­
ring from similar effects to similar 
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causes; consequently, that argument 
requires a great deal of confirmation 
from other arguments. Frey does not 
provide such confi rmation, nor, as the 
previous objections to his analysis 
indicate, is there reason to believe 
that he could find such confi rmation. 
Third, in the course of developing 
his argument, Frey provides counter­
examples to that argument. Frey uses 
such ph rases as "the false belief," 
"true and false beliefs," and "regard­
ing one [belief] but not the other as 
true." 18 Frey here predicates "true" 
and "false" of beliefs themselves, 
rather than predicating these terms of 
the something that is believed. In 
making such predications he follows 
ordinary usage, since we do commonly 
talk about true and false beliefs, even 
more commonly than we tal k about 
what is believed being that something 
is true or false. However, it would 
seem to follow from Frey's argument 
that since beliefs can be true/false, 
they are sentences, since "sentences 
are the sorts of things which [are] 
capable of being true or false." This 
amounts to another reductio of Frey's 
analysis, since saying that beliefs are 
sentences clearly confuses the psy­
chological with the linguistic. 19 
Finally, even if we were to try to 
decide whether what is believed does 
or does not concern sentences on the 
basis of how certain predicates are 
commonly deployed when discussing 
beliefs, at least as good and probably 
even a better case can be made for 
saying that what is believed is that 
certain states of affairs are the case 
than for saying that what is believed 
is that certain sentences are true. 
We can equally well say either "what 
is believed is true" or "what is 
believed is the case." Again, in 
response to a question like "Does he 
really believe that?," we can equally 
well respond "yes, he bel ieves that 
that is true" or "yes, he believes that 
that is the case." Additionally, if we 
were to ask "What makes a belief 
true? ," the common answer would not 
be "a belief is true if what is believed 
is true" but "a belief is true if what 
is believed is the case." This sug­
gest that what is true or false here 
are beliefs, with what is believed 
being that something is or is not the 
case, and, of cou rse, as Frey himself 
acknowledges, the sorts of things that 
are or are not the case are not sen­
tences but states of affai rs. The 
place of truth and falsity in the anal­
ysis of beliefs, belief statements, and 
statements and questions about beliefs 
is at least not as clear as and proba­
bly other than Frey suggests and his 
argument requires. 
Thus, Frey fails to demonstrate 
that language is required for belief 
and, consequently, fails to demon­
strate that animals cannot have 
belief-mediated desi res. 
Tu rning to simple desi res, sllch as 
wanting food, Frey presents the fol­
lowing argument to show that the 
self-consciousness required for having 
such desires requires linguistic abil­
ity: 
I adopt the view that 'P-predi­
cates', which include such 
things as thoughts, feelings, 
memories, and perceptions, can 
only be ascribed to oneself if 
they can be ascribed to others 
and that one can know one has 
or experiences a particular 
P-predicate R only if one can 
know that other people have or 
experience R. And following 
Wittgenstein's private language 
argument, I adopt the view 
that P-predicate R, for exam­
ple 'pain', does not (and can­
not) have meaning by standing 
for or naming a sensation to 
which each of us has access in 
his own case· but rather has 
meaning in virtue of certain 
public rules and conventions 
which can be adhered to and 
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transgressed, where adherence 
and transgression can be pub­
licly checked. In this way, I 
come with Hacker to the view 
that the meaningful ascription 
of P-predicate R to oneself is 
only possible . . . within the 
context and confines of a pub­
lic language. 7. U 
The problem with this argument is 
that it begs the question. Frey 
infers from Wittgenstein's argument 
against a private language that self­
consciousness requires knowing a 
public language. However, before 
Frey's argument that ascribing 
P-predicates to oneself requires know­
ing a public language even becomes 
relevant to whether animals can have 
simple desires, an argument is needed 
to show that feeling pain, to use 
Frey's example, is ascribing the 
P-predicate "pain" to oneself. That 
is, an argument is needed to show 
that self-consciousness is properly 
interpreted as the linguistic activity 
of ascribing certain predicates to one­
self. 
Psychology does not support a lin­
guistic interpretation of self-con­
sciousness. When I  h it my thumb 
with the hammer, I  am conscious of 
being in pain, but I  do not form the 
thought "I am in pain" or otherwise 
ascribe the predicate "pain" to myself. 
Also, interpreting my consciousness of 
being in pain as the fact that I  would 
assent to "I am in pain," if asked, 
would be. blatantly arbitrary, since 
there are many things besides assent­
ing to "I am in pain" which someone 
in pain would natu rally (be ready to) 
do, e.g., screaming and writhing. 
Additionally, we may note that 
Frey's argument here would lead to 
the conclusion that animals are not 
conscious. Notice that in the above 
citation Frey's' analysis of self-con­
sciousness in terms of ascribing 
P-predicates to oneself is said to 
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apply not only to simple desires but 
to "such things as thoughts, feelings, 
memories, and perceptions." If all 
such things are beyond the capacities 
of non-language users, saying, as 
Frey does,21 that, nonetheless, they 
are still conscious would seem to be 
devoid of content. How can one be 
conscious, if one cannot perceive, 
feel, desire, remember, think, or 
believe? Furthermore, Frey seems to 
presume that to be conscious of X 
involves ascribing predicates to X (or 
bei ng ready to assent to sentences 
ascribing predicates to Xl. Why else 
would he presume that being self-con­
scious involves ascribing P-predicates 
to oneself? Additionally, Frey's argu­
ment is based on an analysis of the 
requi rements for the meani ngful 
ascription of any sort of predicate, 
for it is based on an analysis of what 
makes language in general meaningful. 
Frey does not give us any reason to 
believe that bei ng conscious of oneself 
is essentially tied to linguistic ability 
while being conscious of other things 
is not, and on the su dace of it, at 
least, feeling pain does not seem to be 
intimately tied to language while see­
ing colors and hearing noises are not. 
Consequently, if Frey's a rgument were 
sound, only language users could be 
conscious, which would, since Frey 
maintains that animals lack linguistic 
ability, exclude animals from being 
conscious. Apparently, Frey is 
strongly opposed to denying that ani­
mals are conscious, since he adamantly 
rejects the suggestion that he is 
denying consciousness to animals; so, 
unless Frey can show that being con­
scious of oneself requires linguistic 
ability while being conscious of other 
things does not, we have a reductio 
of Frey's position here which he would 
have to accept as discrediting his 
attempt to deny that animals can have 
simple desi res. 
Thus, Frey has not provided us 
any reason to doubt what we ordinar­
ily believe, viz., that animals can 
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desire food, water, and relief from 
pain. It follows that Frey has once 
again failed to show that animals can­
not meet the interest requirement for 
having moral rights. In the cases 
both of belief-mediated desi res and of 
simple desires, the fundamental flaw 
in Frey's argument is that he has 
presumed what he claims to be show­









Since in our ordinary dealings with 
infants, pets, and other non-language 
using animals we successfully deal 
with them as desiring beings who take 
an interest in what pleases and pains 
them and as sentient beings with 
affective needs, some of which they 
take an interest in and some of which 
they merely have an interest in, the 
bu rden of proof is su rely on Frey and 
others who would deny that animals 
can have desires or that the interests 
of animals cannot be significantly dis­
tinguished from the needs of plants 
and other non-feeling things. Since 
Frey has failed to shoulder that bur­
den, we may continue to rely on ordi­
nary experience and to hold that ani­
mals have affective needs and that 
they have complex and simple desi res 
concerning the fulfillment or frustra­
tion of those needs, as well as desi res 
concerning things that are not really 
in thei r best interest, such as playing 
in the street. It follows that both 
horns of Frey's dilemma are blunt and 
harmless, for whether one analyzes 
"interests" in terms of having an 
interest or taking an interest, animals 
meet the interest requirement for hav­
ing moral rights. 22 
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